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ABSTRACT 
 
Can judges interpret the law in a manner that is objectively verifiable, 
or do judges necessarily – even if unconsciously – inject their own 
predispositions and biases into their decisions? It is difficult to decide 
whether such a question is frivolous in the post-Realist age, or whether it 
is the is the single most important question that we can ask about our legal 
system. I endorse both responses. The question, as phrased, is both vitally 
important and unanswerable on its own terms. Rather than seeking an 
elusive objective standard by which to measure the correctness of “a 
judgment,” I argue that we need to develop a vocabulary to assess 
whether judges are “judging well,” because it is the activity of judging 
well that serves as the cornerstone of the rule of law. 
 The article unfolds in three parts. First, I briefly review Professor 
William Popkin’s admirable work as a starting point for analysis. 
Drawing on Kantian aesthetics, Popkin defends the ability to assess non-
deductive judgments. I develop his conception of “ordinary judgment” 
along different lines, arguing for a conception of “judging well” that is 
rooted in practical reasoning as articulated rhetorically. Leslie Paul Thiel 
brings contemporary work in neuroscience to bear on what I term 
“rhetorical knowledge.” 
  
 
 
* Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, jmootz@pacific.edu. I would 
like to thank Brian Larson for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. I dedicate this essay to 
Anthony M. Kennedy, Jr., Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. I was fortunate to get 
to know Justice Kennedy during my service as Dean because, among other notable accomplishments 
in his career, he is the longest serving adjunct faculty member at McGeorge. Justice Kennedy 
embodies the rhetorical ideal of “wisdom speaking eloquently,” and during his long tenure he certainly 
has judged well. 
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I conclude that judgment is a foundational capacity deeply rooted in 
the structure of our brain and intrinsic to our sense of self. We cultivate 
rhetorical knowledge through interpretive experiences that provide us 
with dynamic resources to exercise judgment in changing circumstances. 
Law judges exhibit this fundamental activity in a disciplined manner. 
Judgment is real and constrained, even if it is neither deductive nor 
rationally defensible as an objective fact. 
I defend my account by assessing the opinions in Hively v. Ivy Tech 
Community College, the Seventh Circuit case that held that discriminating 
against LGBT employees is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. 
The multiple opinions provide competing conceptions of judging well, and 
I assess them in light of my theory. 
 Judging well is not a mysterious or rare event. It is something that we 
do and see every day. By attending to how we judge well, we can best 
preserve the fragile structures that subtend the operation of our legal 
system and engender hope that the quest for justice, however, imperfect 
and halting, can continue. 
INTRODUCTION 
Can judges interpret the law in a manner that is objectively verifiable, 
or do judges necessarily–even if unconsciously–fall prey to their own 
predispositions and biases when judging? It is difficult to decide whether 
such a question is frivolous in the post-Realist age, or whether it is the 
single most important question that we can ask about our legal system. I 
endorse both responses in this essay. The question, as phrased, is both 
vitally important and unanswerable on its own terms. Rather than seeking 
an elusive objective standard by which to measure the correctness of “a 
judgment,” I argue that we need to develop a vocabulary to assess whether 
judges are “judging well,” because the activity of judging well serves as 
the cornerstone of the rule of law. 
I take a familiar tack in contemporary hermeneutical philosophy by 
rejecting the tendency to assume that one must choose between striving to 
achieve objective truth as apprehended in the “view from nowhere” or be 
relegated to the exercise of a largely unconstrained subjective will. Legal 
practice is relentlessly “in between” these falsely opposed alternatives.1 
“Judging well” is an activity that can be understood and assessed from the 
pragmatic intellectual comportment that I describe in this article. 
 
 
 1. See FRANCIS J. MOOTZ III, THE UNBEARABLE IN-BETWEENESS OF LAW, IN READING 
RICOEUR THROUGH LAW (Eileen Brennan, Marc de Leeuw, & George H. Taylor, eds., forthcoming 
2020). 
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This article is organized in three parts. First, I briefly review two books 
by Professor William Popkin that serve as a touchstone for my analysis.  
Second, I critique the theoretical orientation of Popkin’s approach and 
provide an alternative philosophical grounding for his arguments and 
conclusions. I draw on pragmatism, rhetoric and hermeneutics, as 
informed by contemporary studies of judgment, to articulate how we can 
assess whether a judge has judged well. Finally, I conclude by describing 
judging well as critically important to defending the rule of law in the 
post-realist and post-modernist age. I bring the theoretical issues to bear in 
the context of a recent Court of Appeals case that generated multiple 
opinions on whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is 
cognizable under Title VII as discrimination because of sex. These 
competing opinions provide a basis for assessing my theory of judging 
well. Judging well is not a mysterious event. It is something that we do 
and see every day. By attending to how we judge well, we can best 
preserve the fragile structures that subtend the operation of our legal 
system and engender hope that the quest for justice, however imperfect 
and halting, can continue. 
I. ORDINARY JUDGING VERSUS OBJECTIVE JUDGEMENT  
How can judges discern the meaning of the law? Our common law 
heritage suggests a murky practice of the ineffable law “working itself 
pure” through centuries of casuistic decision-making by judges seeking the 
just resolution in the individual case before them. In the age of the 
legislative and administrative state, however, this comforting common law 
myth is largely irrelevant. In many cases, a judge is faced with a textual 
articulation of “the law” in the form of statutes and regulations. The judge 
cannot hide behind the “brooding omnipresence in the skies” for the basis 
of her judgment: she must declare the meaning of a particular legal text for 
the case at hand. 
William Popkin’s work on legal judgment serves as a starting point for 
my analysis. I am not engaging a “straw man” as my interlocutor. Popkin 
has written persuasively about the role of judges, particularly with regard 
to statutory interpretation. My goal is to refine and recast his arguments by 
bringing the emphasis from assessing judgments to characterizing what it 
means to judge well. This shift is premised on a serious critique, but 
because my analysis is congenial to his general conclusions it is my hope 
that Popkin might endorse my thesis. 
Popkin has written a comprehensive and persuasive history of the 
changing contours of statutory interpretation as we moved from a common 
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law system to a positivist system rooted in democratic legislation.2 He was 
motivated by the crisis of confidence that arose after the relative consensus 
of the Legal Process school fractured into competing theories about how 
judges interpret, and should interpret, statutes. On one hand, we assume 
that judges engage in activities that can be assessed by objective criteria 
with analytic rigor, permitting us to ensure that judges are following the 
law created by the democratically elected legislature. On the other hand, 
no single theory of statutory interpretation appears capable of capturing—
and certainly not definitively directing—this practice, nor does it appear 
feasible to develop such a comprehensive theory. Popkin confronts this 
crisis by looking to the long historical development of current judicial 
practice. He concludes that judges inevitably must engage in lawmaking to 
some extent, and that this “ordinary judging” ensures that statutes remain 
effective as the passage of time and emergence of new contexts presents 
challenges of interpretation. He insists that the best means of “justifying 
judicial discretion in statutory interpretation is to accept the notion that 
judging is an ordinary activity, neither grounded in any exceptional skill or 
expertise, nor threatening to usurp legislative power.”3 
Ordinary judging depends on human capacities that enable us to 
exercise judgment in situations of unresolvable uncertainty. Popkin argues 
that these capacities are real and can be deployed in a reasonable manner 
with integrity, rooting them in a unique combination of Kantian aesthetic 
judgment and Aristotelian practical reasoning. Kant famously 
distinguished “taste” (as to which there can be no objective accounting) 
and “beauty” (as to which we make claims that solicit the considered 
judgment of all persons).4 Popkin contends that judges draw on the latter 
capacity, in that they recognize that there is no unifying common sense of 
judgment that operates immediately, but that they can make modest and 
persuasive claims to correctness that should appeal to all.5 But this 
analysis goes only so far. Judges do not interpret statutes as stand-alone 
artifacts in a museum. Instead, judges work within a political organization 
that grounds virtually all social activity. Aristotelian phronesis (practical 
wisdom) and the American Pragmatist movement capture this broader, 
problem-solving character of judging. The “Aristotelian judge adopts a 
broader perspective than the Kantian judge, taking account of how 
 
 
        2.  WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1999). 
        3.  Id. at 208. 
        4.  IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT (2001). 
 5.   See POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT, supra note 2, at 217–18. I have made a similar claim by 
reading Chaïm Perleman’s idea of appealing to a “universal audience” within the nontheistic natural 
law tradition. See Francis J. Mootz III, Perelman’s Theory of Argumentation and Natural Law, 43 
PHIL. & RHETORIC 383–402 (2010). 
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judgments fit, both substantively and institutionally, into the larger 
political system.”6 Practical wisdom reflects our temporality. “Change 
forces the judge to look beyond the statutory author to the future audience 
and that, in turn, forces the judge to ask questions that cannot insulate him 
from becoming engaged in policy concerns and judicial choices that have 
not been resolved by the historical legislature.”7 
Popkin concedes that his construction of a theoretical justification 
drawing from two very different traditions raises significant questions that 
cannot be fully addressed in his historically oriented book.8 Recently, he 
provides a more detailed account of judgment that draws solely on Kantian 
aesthetics. In Judgment,9 Popkin sets out to determine the basis for 
declaring that an interpretation of law is “substantively correct,” and not 
just a matter of the judge’s subjective “will.”10 On one hand, a judge is not 
like a consumer who reviews a restaurant on Yelp according to mere 
subjective preference,11 but neither is he like God, who is an unfathomable 
lawgiver who must be obeyed rather than scrutinized.12 Popkin considers 
two plausible analogies for the work of a judge: sports officiating and art 
criticism. 
The work of sports officials to judge ongoing play by the rules of the 
game may appear similar to the work of law judges, as suggested by Chief 
Justice John Roberts’s famous testimony that judges are like baseball 
umpires who simply call the balls and strikes.13 Popkin finds this analogy 
inapt. Sports officials rarely explain their rulings other than to cite the rule 
in question, and their discretionary decisions are rarely subject to review 
of any kind, although technology now provides the means to challenge 
calls based purely on visual acuity, such as whether a player stepped out of 
bounds.14 In sports, maintaining the flow of the game is prioritized over 
 
 
 6. See POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT, supra note 2, at 219. 
 7. Id. at 229. 
 8. Id. at 215. 
  9.  WILLIAM D. POPKIN, JUDGMENT: WHAT LAW JUDGES CAN LEARN FROM SPORTS 
OFFICIATING AND ART CRITICISM (2017). 
 10. Id. at xv. 
 11. Id. at 3–4. 
 12. Id. at 5–12. 
13.   Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John. G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (opening 
statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., nominee) (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; 
they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the 
rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire. . . . And I will 
remember that it's my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.”), transcript available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/. 
       14. POPKIN, JUDGMENT, supra note 9, at 20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 11:1 
 
 
ensuring that every call is correct, and officials undertake no effort to 
persuade the audience of the correctness of their decisions.15 
On the other hand, “unlike the sports official and like the law judge, the 
critic tries to persuade the audience that he has got it right.”16 Food critics 
and art critics, as opposed to Yelp reviewers, claim to offer a reasoned 
basis for concluding that a particular effort is worthy of praise, for reasons 
that are neither entirely subjective nor capable of purely objective 
analysis.17 Both criticism and law judging are interplays of formal and 
substantive considerations,18 and involve the application of general criteria 
to a specific instance.19 This analogy, though, does little to temper the 
question that motivates Popkin’s inquiry: can judging be more than merely 
the exercise of will? By proposing aesthetic criticism as the best analogy 
to law judging, he sets the stage for a more detailed inquiry into the 
Kantian analysis of “subjective universals” which depends upon objective 
claims that cannot be demonstrably proved.20 
Kant’s effort to justify the integrity of judgments about beauty as more 
than mere subjective taste is premised on the claim by the critic that her 
judgment should garner the assent of the audience, even if that assent may 
not be logically compelled. Popkin expressly embraces a rhetorical reading 
of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. 
This perspective on judging remains troubling to many people 
because, without criteria that can provide an objective anchor, all 
the judicial opinion can do is lift itself up by its own bootstraps. 
Judging is, at best, an effort at rhetorical self-justification addressed 
to a knowledgeable audience to whom it is accountable. The 
Kantian judge’s effort to make objective judgments by relying on 
judicial rhetoric to justify an opinion should come as something of a 
surprise given Kant’s view that rhetoric “merits no respect 
whatever,” although it will find support in a recent book by Scott 
Stroud. Stroud makes a determined effort to “reclaim rhetoric as 
part of Kant’s project of moral improvement.” The author laments 
that Kant’s negative comments about rhetoric have had the 
unfortunate impact of preventing a serious defense of Kant’s view 
of rhetoric.21 
 
 
 15. Id. at 27–30. 
 16. Id. at 33. 
 17. Id. at 42. 
 18. Id. at 52–60. 
 19. Id. at 61–67. 
 20. Id. at 83. 
       21.   POPKIN, JUDGMENT, supra note 9, at 103–04 (quoting Robert J. Dostal, Kant and Rhetoric, 
13 PHIL. & RHETORIC 223 (1980) and SCOTT R. STROUD, KANT AND THE PROMISE OF RHETORIC 8 
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 . . . .  
An important inference from this perspective on objective judging is 
that the judge must accept the responsibility for convincing the 
audience that the judicial opinion is a conscientious attempt to reach 
the right legal decision. There is no place to hide – not the text, the 
linguistic and substantive canons, the legislative purpose, legislative 
history, or predictions of the future. The criterion for good judging 
is how well the judge makes those choices and accepts that 
responsibility.”22 
Popkin concludes that commentators must assure the public that the 
reality of judging is appropriate in our constitutional democracy, even if 
the judgments are not certain and subject to objective assessment. “Law 
judging (like art criticism) is objective only in the sense that the judge 
presents his or her judgment as deserving of acceptance by the audience. 
The judicial opinion’s rhetoric demands agreement from the audience to 
which he or she is accountable, which may or may not be forthcoming.”23 
In the end, then, Popkin reaffirms the problematic nature of judicial 
decision-making but he seeks at least partial refuge in Kant’s analysis of 
aesthetic judgment by way of analogy to the work of art critics. In general, 
Popkin’s conclusion is certainly correct, and his use of Kant may inspire 
faith in the enterprise of judging. However, reading Kant through a 
rhetorical lens is problematic when compared to a straightforward analysis 
of the rhetorical and hermeneutical dimensions of practical judgment. 
Popkin’s analysis can be strengthened by eliminating his reference to 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment and appealing directly to these ancient 
traditions to defend the activity of judging well.  Instead of dropping the 
uncomfortable instability of practical reasoning from his account and 
concentrating on Kantian aesthetics, Popkin would have been better served 
to do precisely the opposite. 
  
 
 
(2014)). 
       22.   Id. at 105. 
       23.   Id. at 139. 
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II. JUDGING WELL AS PRACTICAL REASONING  
My thesis is straightforward. Longstanding traditions of interpretation 
and rhetoric, most recently carried forward in pragmatism and exemplified 
in legal practice, provide us with the conceptual resources to judge well. 
These same traditions enable us to assess whether another person is 
judging well. A judge does not have recourse to an objective defense for 
any particular judgment, but she does have recourse to non-subjective 
capacities in rendering a judgment. Similarly, we can make a principled 
claim about whether she has judged well. I develop this thesis in three 
steps. First, I critique Kantian aesthetics as a model for judging well, 
following the arguments of philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer in his 
resuscitation of Aristotelian practical reasoning. Second, I develop the 
rhetorical dimensions of judging well in terms of Chaïm Perelman’s “new 
rhetoric” as an extension of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Finally, I argue that 
this hermeneutical and rhetorical account of practical reasoning is rooted 
firmly in our faculties and human capacities and is not simply a regrettable 
failure of cognitive reasoning. I conclude that my analysis provides an 
accurate account of judging well. Admittedly, it may be more difficult to 
explain the integrity of judging to a lay public that embraces the folk 
psychology of a sharp distinction between objects and subjects, but we 
must begin with an accurate account before undertaking the task of 
persuading the public. 
A. The Critique of Kant’s Aesthetics 
 Popkin originally drew from both the Aristotelian tradition of 
practical reasoning and the Kantian tradition of judgment to ground 
judgment in law. In his recent book, he looked solely to Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment. This was an unfortunate turn. The Kantian tradition has done 
much to undermine the long tradition of practical reasoning that found a 
strong voice in Aristotle and continued until the emergence of the modern 
natural sciences as the sole criterion of knowledge. Kant does not provide 
a credible justification for law judging; in fact, just the opposite is true. 
Kant’s philosophy is an important source of our current crisis of 
confidence in the integrity of judgment. 
 In Truth and Method,24 Hans-Georg Gadamer presents a 
phenomenology of understanding, challenging the exclusivity claimed by 
the model of the natural sciences. Gadamer begins his work with an 
extensive account of how truth emerges in the experience of art, arguing 
 
 
   24.   HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall, 
trans. rev., 2d rev. ed. 1989).  
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against the subjectivization and formalization of aesthetic judgment.25 
Gadamer shows that Kant was pivotal in the final, decisive shift from the 
humanist tradition to the scientific model, inasmuch as Kant relegated 
judgment to the aesthetic realm and divorced it from the full moral and 
political ramifications of the humanist tradition of judgment. Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment 
[C]onstituted a turning point. It was the end of [the humanist] 
tradition but also the beginning of a new development. . . . The 
radical subjectivization involved in Kant’s new way of grounding 
aesthetics was truly epoch-making. In discrediting any kind of 
theoretical knowledge except that of natural science, it compelled 
the human sciences to rely on the methodology of the natural 
sciences in conceptualizing themselves.26 
By reducing judgment to aesthetics and acknowledging the lack of a 
theoretically secure basis similar to that which he articulated in the 
Critique of Practical Reason, Kant wholly undermined the tradition of 
moral and political judgment having a sound basis in its historically 
unfolding character.27 Kant defended the judgment that emerges from the 
corresponding genius of the artist and viewer to embrace the work of art as 
a formal object through the process of aesthetic differentiation.28 Against 
this reductivism, Gadamer argues that the experience of art is in fact a 
model of our knowing relation to the world, and thus is fundamental rather 
than peripheral.29 In Kantian terms, Gadamer is arguing that the three 
Critiques were published in inverse order of their significance for human 
understanding.30 
 Gadamer concludes by distinguishing two senses of “experience” in 
the German language: one is a fleeting, adventurous occurrence 
(Erlebnisse), and the other is a deeper constitutive relation with something 
 
 
 25. See id. at 3–169 (“Part One: The Question of Truth as it Emerges in the Experience of Art”). 
       26.   Id. at 40–41. 
       27.   Id. at 38–39. It is not so much that Kant rejected the capacity for judgment, but that he 
constrained its role so significantly. By retaining a narrow realm of judgment that his successors, such 
as Hannah Arendt, then tried to resuscitate and draw out of his work, Kant devalued rather than 
promoted the role of judgment in human life. See Ronald Beiner, Hannah Arendt on Judging, in 
Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy 89–156 (Ronald Beiner, ed., 1982). Beiner 
gathered material published by Arendt from which he draws a speculative overview of how she 
intended to expand Kant’s views on judgment before her untimely death. 
       28. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 24, at 85–92. 
29.   Id. at 70. 
       30. Rudolph A. Makkreel, IMAGINATION AND INTERPRETATION IN KANT: THE HERMENEUTICAL 
IMPORT OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 170 (1990) (arguing that Gadamer reads Kant too narrowly, 
and that Kant would acknowledge the inversion of his works and the ubiquity of judgment). 
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or someone that yields knowledge (Erfahrung). 
 The pantheon of art is not a timeless present that presents itself 
to a pure aesthetic consciousness, but the act of a mind and spirit 
that has collected and gathered itself historically . . .  For this 
reason, we must adopt a standpoint in relation to art and the 
beautiful that does not pretend to immediacy but corresponds to the 
historical nature of the human condition. The appeal to immediacy, 
to the instantaneous flash of genius, to the significance of 
“experiences” (Erlebnisse), cannot withstand the claim of human 
existence to continuity and unity of self-understanding. The binding 
quality of the experience (Erfahrung) of art must not be 
disintegrated by aesthetic consciousness. 
 This negative insight, positively expressed, is that art is 
knowledge and experiencing an artwork means sharing in that 
knowledge. 
 This raises the question of how one can do justice to the truth of 
aesthetic experience (Erfahrung) and overcome the radical 
subjectivization of aesthetic that began with Kant’s Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgment. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . Does not the experience of art contain a claim to truth which is 
certainly different from that of science, but just as certainly is not 
inferior to it? And is not the task of aesthetics precisely to ground 
the fact that the experience (Erfahrung) of art is a mode of 
knowledge of a unique kind, certainly different from that sensory 
knowledge which provides science with the ultimate data from 
which it constructs the knowledge of nature, and certainly different 
from all moral rational knowledge, and indeed from all conceptual 
knowledge–but still knowledge, i.e., conveying truth? 
 This can hardly be recognized if, with Kant, one measures the 
truth of knowledge by the scientific concept of knowledge and the 
scientific concept of reality. It is necessary to take the concept of 
experience (Erfahrung) more broadly than Kant did, so that the 
experience of the work of art can be understood as experience.31 
We need not reluctantly conclude that Kant’s tepid acceptance of a 
reduced realm of judgment is the strongest case to be made for law 
judging. 
 
 
 31. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 24, at 97–98. 
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After recovering the experience of truth in art, Gadamer expands his 
inquiry to the historical nature of human understanding as captured in the 
famous account of the “hermeneutic circle,” in which one can understand a 
text only by understanding its parts, but one can only understand the parts 
by understanding the text as a whole.  Acknowledging the historical flow 
at work, rather than attempting to isolate moments in time for discrete 
analysis, resolves the paradox. We seek to understand by projecting our 
pre-judgments in a motivated, rather than timeless, manner. Gadamer 
emphasizes that understanding occurs only in application: I experience the 
historical trajectory of the work of art in this moment, and I derive 
meaning from a text for present purposes. 
The [hermeneutic] circle, then, is not formal in nature. It is neither 
subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the 
interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the 
interpreter. The anticipation of meaning that governs our 
understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds 
from the commonality that binds us to the tradition. Tradition is not 
simply a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves 
inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, 
and hence further determine it ourselves. Thus the circle of 
understanding is not a “methodological” circle, but describes an 
element of the ontological structure of understanding.32 
Any attempt to stand apart from artifacts in an objective manner 
betrays an experience that is always historically situated and rooted in 
present concerns. 
We do not have to speculate how Gadamer’s philosophy might connect 
with law judging, because Gadamer explicitly makes the case. At a critical 
juncture of his explication of our historical nature, Gadamer famously 
turns to legal interpretation as a model of the experience of knowing.33 
Gadamer rejects the assumption that the practical work of law judges 
obscures deeper truths about the nature of interpretation and judgment. 
In fact the situation seems to me just the opposite. Legal 
hermeneutics serves to remind us what the real procedure of the 
human sciences is. Here we have the model for the relationship 
between past and present that we are seeking. The judge who adapts 
the transmitted law to the needs of the present is undoubtedly 
 
 
 32. Id. at 293. 
 33. Id. at 324–41 (“The Exemplary Significance of Legal Hermeneutics”). 
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seeking to perform a practical task, but his interpretation of the law 
is by no means merely for that reason an arbitrary revision.34 
The “adaptation” at work is inevitable because the judge is always 
applying the law to the present case, rather than adopting the pretense of 
timeless pronouncements of meaning, and yet this adaptation occurs 
within a community and historical tradition that permits the participants to 
understand the evolution of the law as something more than the exercise of 
“arbitrary” subjectivity by the judge.35 Gadamer insists that all 
understanding is interpretative, by which he means that it occurs in 
application of the unfolding tradition to a question.36 The nature of law 
judging is not a cause for embarrassment or lament; instead, it is a 
particularly vivid example of what occurs in all understanding. 
Gadamer does not propose a method that judges can follow to ensure 
an objectively valid interpretation. Rather, his project is to outline a 
“philosophical hermeneutics,” which rests on an ontological claim that all 
human understanding is interpretive, in the sense that understanding 
occurs only in the application of tradition to a question at hand. 
Experiencing art is a playful encounter that draws us outside of ourselves, 
tapping into our hermeneutical nature. Following Gadamer’s critique of 
Kant and his argument that law judging exemplifies human understanding, 
we are now much better positioned to recast, and then to answer, Popkin’s 
angst about how we can assess whether judges are acting in an objectively 
correct manner rather than exerting their subjective will. 
We must rephrase Popkin’s question because it buys into a subject-
object bifurcation that Gadamer expressly targets. Gadamer critiques Kant 
for endorsing a shared subjectivism in the aesthetic realm. More broadly, 
he argues against the view that a text is a discrete object whose true 
meaning is discerned by the interpreter, as a subject, using appropriate 
 
 
       34. Id. at 327–28. 
35.   Gadamer argues: 
The work of interpretation is to concretize the law in each specific case–i.e., it is a work of 
application. The creative supplementing of the law that is involved is a task reserved to the 
judge, but he is subject to the law in the same way as is every other member of the 
community. It is part of the idea of a rule of law that the judge’s judgment does not proceed 
from an arbitrary and unpredictable decision, but from the just weighing up of the whole. 
Anyone who has immersed himself in the particular situation is capable of undertaking this 
just weighing-up. 
Id. at 329. 
36.   Gadamer expressly states that law judging reveals what happens in all interpretation.  
When a judge regards himself as entitled to supplement the original meaning of the text of a 
law, he is doing exactly what takes place in all other understanding. . . . Application does not 
mean first understanding a given universal in itself and then afterward applying it to a 
concrete case. [Application] is the very understanding of the universal—the text—itself. 
Id. at 340–41. 
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methodologies. He characterizes interpretation as a “fusion of horizons,” 
in which meaning emerges from the encounter between a reader motivated 
by a question and a text that has a history of previous applications.37 We 
cannot measure the work of the judge against the fixed meaning of the 
text, because understanding resides neither in the subject nor the object, 
but in the fusion of horizons. 
 
B. Judging Well and Rhetorical Knowledge 
 
An ontological claim that genuine understanding involves a fusion of 
horizons that occurs in the application of tradition to a question recasts 
Popkin’s central question, but does not answer it. How can we better 
characterize this fusion in order to test the appropriateness of particular 
interpretations? Popkin correctly turns to the rhetorical tradition to provide 
an answer, but he does so only by working against the grain of his Kantian 
foundation. In contrast, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics rejects the 
Kantian approach and expressly embraces the rhetorical tradition.38 
Gadamer argues that rhetoric’s constitutive role in political society in 
ancient Greece is paralleled today by the sustaining power of 
hermeneutical appropriation of traditionary materials.39 Acknowledging 
Chaïm Perelman’s important contribution to rehabilitating the full scope of 
ancient rhetoric, Gadamer applies the rhetorical idea of political truth 
 
 
37.   Gadamer uses more provocative terms, characterizing the interpreter as “prejudiced” in the 
sense of having prejudgments, and the text as having a “history of effects,” so that it can never be 
encountered as if for the first time. Rather than a subject decoding an object, there are two “horizons” 
at play as the traditionary text is applied in the present. The metaphor of a “fusion of horizons” is 
meant to capture the fact that neither persists in exactly the same manner after the experience of 
understanding. 
In fact, the horizon of the present is continually in the process of being formed because we are 
continually having to test all our prejudices. . . . [U]nderstanding is always the fusion of these 
horizons supposedly existing by themselves. . .  
 If, however, there is no such thing as these distinct horizons, why do we speak of the 
fusion of horizons and not simply of the formation of the one horizon, whose bounds are set 
in the depths of tradition? . . . Every encounter with tradition that takes place within historical 
consciousness involves the experience of a tension between the text and the present. The 
hermeneutical task consists in not covering up this tension by attempting a naive assimilation 
of the two but in consciously bringing it out. . . . 
. . . In the process of understanding, a real fusing of horizons occurs–which means that as the 
historical horizon [of the text, for example] is projected, it is simultaneously superseded. To 
bring about this fusion . . . is the problem of application, which is to be found in all 
understanding [and is, in fact, the central problem of hermeneutics]. 
Id. at 306–07. 
 38. See FRANCIS J. MOOTZ III, RHETORICAL KNOWLEDGE IN LEGAL PRACTICE AND CRITICAL 
LEGAL THEORY 6–10 (2006). 
39.   See id. at 9–10. 
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grounded on the probable to the hermeneutical experience, arguing that 
“[c]onvincing and persuading, without being able to prove . . . are 
obviously as much the aim and measure of understanding and 
interpretation as they are the aim and measure of the art of oration and 
persuasion.”40 A prominent venue for this hermeneutical experience today 
is the legal system, which is premised on the production and interpretation 
of authoritative texts as sources of governing authority rather than on the 
performance and reception of speeches before the citizens of the polis. 
Rejecting the scientific impulse to reduce law to a disciplined 
methodology of deduction, Gadamer describes the hermeneutical 
experience in terms of a rhetorical engagement in the form of a 
conversation between judge and text. 
The model of conversation may seem naive and forced,41 but 
Gadamer’s point is to emphasize that neither text nor interpreter remain 
the same after interpretation. The text’s “history of effects” has been 
augmented, as has the interpreter’s understanding. Rather than something 
done to a text, or extracted from a text, interpretation is a rhetorical event. 
The hermeneutic experience of the judge parallels the need for a rhetor to 
conceive a speech only in connection with the particular audience that will 
be addressed on a particular occasion. To better understand this 
phenomenon, we turn to Chaïm Perelman, who further elucidates the 
rhetorical dimensions of judgment that Gadamer identifies. 
In his first major work, Perelman demonstrated that arguments about 
justice could not be rationally assessed because they go beyond formal 
logic.42 This unsettling conclusion led him to develop an informal logic of 
justice,43 rejecting the Cartesian championing of certain truth and its 
resulting skepticism. 
The imperialism of rationalist dogmatism finds its counterpart in the 
nihilism of positivistic scepticism. Either each question is resolved 
by finding the objectively best solution and this is the task of 
reason, or truth does not exist and every solution depends upon 
 
 
 40. HANS-GEORGE GADAMER, ON THE SCOPE AND FUNCTION OF HERMENEUTICAL REFLECTION 
(G. B. Hess & R. E. Palmer trans.), in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 24 (David E. Linge ed. trans, 
1976). 
 41. Consider Sandy Levinson’s classic observation: “As Chairman mao pointed out, a revolution 
is not a tea party, and the massive disruption in lives that can be triggered by a legal case is not a 
conversation.” Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 386 (1982). 
 42. See Ray D. Dearin, Justice and Justification in the New Rhetoric, in PRACTICAL REASONING 
IN HUMAN AFFAIRS: STUDIES IN HONOR OF CHAÏM PERELMAN 155, 156 (J.L. Golden & J.J. Pilotta 
eds., 1986). 
43.   CHAÏM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES: ESSAYS ON RHETORIC AND 
ITS APPLICATIONS 56 (William Kluback et. al. trans., 1979). 
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subjective factors: reason can be no guide to action.44  
Finding that Kant’s majestic effort to salvage practical reasoning and 
judgment has failed,45 Perelman returns to the rhetorical tradition to 
understand how it is possible to secure adherence to claims about justice 
that cannot be definitively proven.46 With Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, he 
famously articulates the “new rhetoric.”47 
 Drawing from Aristotle’s models of dialectic and rhetoric, Perelman 
argues that reasoning about questions of justice has an epistemological 
status that lies between the exceedingly narrow realm of formal deduction 
and irrational adherence.48 He distinguishes rational thought—in which the 
truth of the matter can be known definitively through careful reflection—
from acting reasonably in circumstances in which the truth of the matter is 
uncertain and multidimensional. Our challenge is to act reasonably rather 
than coercively despite a profound lack of certainty caused by limited 
time, incomplete information, and changing circumstances; disagreements 
about the relevant guiding principles; and the resulting inability to reach a 
complete consensus. In the legal system, arguments are made, judgment is 
issued, and action is taken without objectively-verifiable knowledge about 
the questions in the case at hand.49 
The exigencies of the juridical order, which continues through all 
kinds of upheavals as long as it has not been entirely or partially 
replaced by a new order, clearly show us what is unfeasible in the 
advice of Descartes, asking us to make a tabula rosa of all our 
opinions. . . . Nobody has ever seriously put in doubt the totality of 
his opinions, for they test each other reciprocally: One keeps those 
which, up to the present moment, have best resisted the testing. 
This, however, does not guarantee them absolutely against all 
subsequent tests. 
. . . . 
 
 
 44. Id. at 112. 
 45. Id. at 125. 
 46. As Dilip Gaonkar summarizes, Perelman offers rhetoric “as an alternative theory of 
argumentation that can provide grounding for philosophy, jurisprudence, and the human sciences in 
the wake of that colossal failure of the logicist tradition in philosophy from Descartes to logical 
positivism.” Dilip Parmeshwar Gaonkar, The Retrieval of Rhetoric, the New Rhetoric, and the 
Rhetorical Turn: Some Distinctions, 15 INFORMAL LOGIC 53, 58 (1993). 
47.   CHAÏM PERELMAN AND LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON 
ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969). 
 48. Id. at 62. 
 49. CHAÏM PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS IN MORAL AND LEGAL 
REASONING 149 (William Klubach et. al. trans., 1980). 
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Thus rationality, as it presents itself in law, is always a form of 
continuity–conformity to previous rules or justification of the new 
by means of old values. . . . Law teaches us, on the contrary, to 
abandon existing rules only if good reasons [drawn from other 
existing rules] justify their replacement.50 
Joining Gadamer, Perelman argues that legal argumentation and 
judgment is a model of how all human understanding works. They both 
look to Aristotle’s account of practical judgment to explain the 
reasonableness of working through problems conversationally rather than 
methodologically, drawing from existing elements of shared agreement to 
resolve a contemporary problem for the moment rather than for all time. 
I have previously argued that Gadamer and Perelman are developing an 
account of “rhetorical knowledge” that is no less a form of knowledge 
than logical or empirical knowledge.51 Rhetorical knowledge is a practical 
accomplishment that achieves neither apodictic certitude nor collapses into 
a relativistic irrationalism. Consequently, rhetorical knowledge can sustain 
legal practice as a reasonable–even if not thoroughly rationalized–social 
activity. Although rhetorical knowledge is a social achievement rather than 
an intellectual elaboration, it is properly characterized as knowledge. We 
can know the just result in a legal case and we can know the solutions to 
math problems; it is simply the case that our knowledge of justice is 
rhetorical rather than logical.52 
There is an important distinction, but both are forms of knowledge. In a 
seminal article, Robert Scott explains: 
Seeing in a situation possibilities that are possibilities for us and 
 
 
 50. Id. at 169–70. 
51.   See MOOTZ, RHETORICAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 38. This is not to say that we should 
simply reverse the Cartesian prejudice by falsely aggrandizing rhetorical knowledge and devaluing 
logical knowledge. In short, “it is important to seek to understand rhetoric as a way of knowing not the 
way.” Robert L. Scott, On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later, 27 CENTRAL STATES 
SPEECH J. 258, 259 (1977). 
 52. What I am calling “rhetorical knowledge” has a proud and strong tradition reaching back to 
the sophists. See MOOTZ, RHETORICAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 38, at 36–42. Philosopher Calvin 
Schrag has articulated a conception of “communicative praxis” that draws from both philosophical 
hermeneutics and rhetoric, providing a ground for ethics in the “incarnation of the logos within 
discourse and action in a hermeneutic of everyday life. Communicative praxis announces and displays 
reason as discourse. . . . In entering discourse the logos is decentered and situate within the play of 
speaker and hearer as they seek consensus on that which is talked about.” CALVIN O. SCHRAG, 
COMMUNICATIVE PRAXIS AND THE SPACE OF SUBJECTIVITY 193 (1986). Judgments about the 
appropriate course of action in a given situation can be reasoned about, and reasonable, under Schrag’s 
account because they arise from the “responsibility of an engaged and decentered moral self as it 
responds to the prior thought and action already inscribed within a historicized polis,” rather than 
being an ethical judgment issued from an “interior construct of a centered and sovereign subject” of 
the kind touted in the Kantian tradition. CALVIN O. SCHRAG, THE RESOURCES OF RATIONALITY: A 
RESPONSE TO THE POSTMODERN CHALLENGE 175–76 (1992). 
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deciding to act upon some of these possibilities but not others must 
be an important constituent of what we mean by human knowledge. 
The plural pronoun in the foregoing sentence is vital. As social 
beings, our possibilities and choices must often, perhaps almost 
always, be joint. . . . The opacity of living is what bids forth 
rhetoric. A remark in passing by Hans-Georg Gadamer seems to me 
to be an important insight: the “concept of clarity belongs to the 
tradition of rhetoric.” But [contrary to one’s assumption about what 
clarity implies] few terms are more relative than that one nor call 
forth more strongly a human element. Nothing is clear in and of 
itself but [rather clarity is achieved] in some context for some 
persons. 
 Rhetoric may be clarifying these senses: understanding that 
one’s traditions are one’s own, that is, are co-substantial with one’s 
own being and that these traditions are formative in one’s own 
living; understanding that these traditions are malleable and that one 
. . . may act decisively [with others] in ways that continue, extend, 
or truncate the values inherent in one’s culture; and understanding 
that in acting decisively . . . one participates in fixing forces that 
will continue after the purposes for which they have been 
immediately instrumental and will, to some extent, bring others who 
will inherit the modified traditions. Such understanding is genuinely 
knowing and is knowing that becomes filled out in some particulars 
by participating rhetorically.53 
Although Scott was not writing about law judging in particular, his 
work underscores why Gadamer and Perelman both find legal practice to 
be an exemplar of rhetorical knowledge. 
 
C. The Grounds of Practical Judgment   
 
One might still argue that rhetorical knowledge is just a fancy name for 
a kind of cognitive failure. The assumption behind this critique is that 
logical and demonstrative truths are the ground of genuine reasoning, but 
that we necessarily fall short of achieving this desired rigor in certain 
“soft” disciplines. Put simply, critics will argue that rhetorical knowledge 
that is activated hermeneutically and defended rhetorically can at most 
serve as a “second best” effort to be rational, and that judges should be 
 
 
 53, Scott, supra note 51, at 261. 
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held to a higher standard. Gadamer and Perelman do not answer this 
critique as much as flip it on its head. They argue that practical reasoning 
and its hermeneutical-rhetorical character form the core of our 
reasonableness. It is a fundamental mistake to aspire to achieve a context-
free objectivity, because this aspiration fails to accord with the reality of 
reasoning and judgment. Put another way, Kant’s Critique of Judgment 
addressed a ubiquitous human capacity, whereas the ambition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason can never be fulfilled. 
 We may defend this reversal by looking to contemporary work in 
neuroscience, which underscores the hermeneutical and rhetorical nature 
of thinking and judgment. Leslie Paul Thiel demonstrates that the very 
heart of judgment is practical wisdom, as articulated by Aristotle and 
developed by Gadamer and Perelman.54 But he cautions that identifying 
this capacity and linking it to the operation of our brains does not mean 
that we can provide a full theoretical defense of judgment. Indeed, it is 
precisely the vital importance of this foundational capacity that renders it 
immune to abstract theorizing, inasmuch as theorizing is a cognitive skill 
relatively recently developed in the evolutionary process that builds on the 
foundational capacity to judge that has developed over millennia.55 The 
goal of a theoretical inquiry into practical judgment is not to develop a 
“how to” guide, but rather to appreciate how this capacity can be 
augmented and promoted. As Gadamer insists, we can never step outside 
of our prejudiced pre-understanding completely, but it is possible to 
neutralize some particularly unhelpful prejudgments by confronting other 
horizons.56 
 Humans had been exercising judgment for millennia before the idea 
of reasoning to a conclusion took hold. Experience was the basis of 
judgment rather than logic, and heuristics became deeply embedded in the 
functioning of our brains.57 This is not to celebrate an irrational approach 
to life. Rather, it is to recognize that refined cognitive processes build on 
our ability to judge, rather than supplant that ability. “The point is simply 
 
 
 54. LESLIE PAUL THIELE, THE HEART OF JUDGMENT: PRACTICAL WISDOM, NEUROSCIENCE, AND 
NARRATIVE (2006). 
55.  Thiele expresses doubt that we can “gain theoretical access to the essence of this mysterious 
faculty” because  the “human capacity for judgment is an evolutionary adaptation and a product of 
history,” which means that it “has no  enduring, unified, and immutable set of characteristics.” Id. at 
13. One of Thiele’s epigraphs summarizes the point well: “A systematic theory of [practical judgment] 
would be a contradiction in terms. Id. at 17 (quoting Robert Harriman, Theory Without Modernity, in 
PRUDENCE: CLASSICAL VIRTUE, POSTMODERN PRACTICe 19 (Robert Harriman ed., 2003)).  
56.   Thiele endorses Gadamer’s extension of Kant’s focus on aesthetic judgment, which he 
summarizes as: “Good taste, like good judgment, can be developed. And the judgments that ensue 
from this sort of knack, while not strictly verifiable or falsifiable, are available (as Kant also observed) 
to informed debate.” THIELE, supra note 54, at 44. 
 57. Id. at 17–69 (Chapter 1: “An Intellectual History of Judgment”). 
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that moral judgment can and does occur in the absence of abstract 
theorization and principled argument.”58 However, developing and 
reflecting on principles is still important. 
Once articulated, principles may take on lives of their own, circling 
back to influence basic assessments and evaluations. In this respect, 
judgments are developed and transformed by way of the ‘reflective 
equilibrium’ established between the socially cultivated sensibilities 
inhabiting our guts and the theoretically formalized principles that emerge 
from our mouths. Speech is where the unconscious and the conscious 
meet, grapple with each other, and produce the ‘considered judgments’ 
that we find ourselves willing and able to defend. Only by finding their 
voice do judgments rise above the primitive and impoverished.59 
We can learn to refine judging by augmenting our experience and 
learning from that experience, even while acknowledging that we cannot 
secure a timeless truth. Thiel emphasizes that experiential learning is 
essential to the development of judgment because it affects the established 
neural pathways, a process that Gadamer characterized as a “fusion of 
horizons.” “Many are disposed to believe–perhaps academics more so than 
others–that we can (and should) think our way into new ways of doing. 
But the far more common phenomenon is that we do our way into new 
ways of thinking.”60 As Aristotle emphasized, one does not learn to be 
virtuous in school; rather, one becomes virtuous by acting virtuously. 
Thiele concludes that the practical wisdom of judging “is embodied 
learning mindful of its own limits,”61 including the inability to fully 
rationalize or explain how a judgment is reached.62 
 
 
 58. Id. at 73. 
 59. Id. For an excellent defense of “reflective equilibrium” as the appropriate standard for the 
acceptability of a judgment, see Catherine Z. Elgin, Considered Judgment (1996).   
60.   THIELE, supra note 54, at 110. Thiele connects this insight to the functioning of our brains. 
Good judgment, almost everyone since Aristotle agrees, cannot be taught. It has to be gained through 
experience. That is why Aristotle deemed politics a field of study and practice unfit for the young. But 
Aristotle never tells us what it is about experience, as opposed to formal pedagogy, that lends itself to 
the cultivation of judgment. Cognitive neuroscience helps us understand. Formal pedagogy well 
conveys explicit information. Most of the knowledge that goes into our practical judgments, however, 
is implicitly acquired. It is absorbed obliquely. Notwithstanding the tremendous benefits of formal 
education, the cultivation of good judgment demands whole-brain learning. That is primarily offered in 
the school of life. To properly educate intuition, we must concern ourselves with the awesome task of 
understanding – and improving – the lessons learned in this academy. 
Id. at 161–62. For this reason, the rhetorical tradition of arguing a case from both sides is one of the 
best experiential learning techniques. Id. at 157. Of course, this is the core of the activity that judges 
use to hear arguments and to reach a judgment. 
61.   Id. at 112. 
   62. This position draws from the tradition of Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world,” see MARTIN 
HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 49–58 (§§12–13) (Joan Stambaugh trans., 1996), as exemplified in 
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Law judges exemplify the nature of judgment. By focusing on the case 
at hand and offering a written defense of their judgment, they are in a 
position to check their prejudgments against the long history of judging 
that they participate in, even if they could never completely disclose all of 
the factors that led to the judgment.63 Judging is narratively constructed.64 
Indeed, our very selves, including perception and memory, are narratively 
formed.65 For law judges this primal reality is augmented and enhanced by 
the tradition of writing opinions in support of their judgments, and these 
opinions in turn add to the broader legal narrative, which shapes the 
understanding of future judges.  
III. JUDGING JUDGING WELL  
I have argued that judgment is a foundational capacity deeply rooted in 
the structuring of our brain, and intrinsic to our very selves. We cultivate 
rhetorical knowledge through interpretive experiences that provide us with 
dynamic resources to exercise judgment in changing circumstances. Law 
judges regularly exhibit this foundational capacity in a disciplined manner. 
Ironically, Popkin’s concern—how can we legitimate the activity of law 
judges by reference to other professions?—puts the question backwards. It 
is the exemplary practice of law judges that can help us to understand and 
defend the integrity of judgments more generally. Judgment is real and 
constrained, even though it is neither deductive nor rationally defensible as 
an objective fact.66 But Popkin was not concerned only with the integrity 
 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the flesh that grew out of MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (Colin Smith trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962). See M.C. 
DILLON, THE LIVING BODY, IN MERLEAU-PONTY’S ONTOLOGY 130–50 (1988). For an overview of 
contemporary work on “embodied cognition,” see ROBERT A. WILSON & LUCIA FOGLIA, EMBODIED 
COGNITION, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring ed. 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/embodied-cognition/. 
63.  THIELE, supra note 54, at 144–47. Bad judging occurs when a law judge attempts to avoid 
judging at all, pretending that the law can be articulated through rational deductions from fixed rules.  
Because judgment always pertains to things particular, contingent and concrete, it cannot be 
reduced to a wholly deductive enterprise. In this sense, practical judgment is similar to 
musical improvisation: training in theory is most helpful, but responsive flexibility is key. 
The difference in quality between a novice punching out the required notes and master 
musician interpreting a score is patent. It is the difference between mechanically heeding the 
letter of the law and skillfully realizing its spirit. 
Id. at 6. 
       64.   Id. at 201–76. 
 65. Id. at 203–16 (“The Neurological Construction of the Self”). 
66.   As Thiele explains: 
Practical judgment is an aptitude for assessing, evaluating, and choosing in the absence of 
certainties or principles that dictate or generate right answers. Judges cannot rely on 
algorithms. Their efforts always exceed adherence to rules and are not tightly tethered to law. 
Still, the practical judge reveres good rules and laws. The word judge, after all derives from 
the Latin judicem, which refers to a speaker (discus) of law (jus). The activity of judging, 
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of first-order judgments. His project sought to determine how we can 
assess whether a particular judgment has integrity and is not just a 
manifestation of will. I have argued that we should understand judgment 
as an activity rather than an object of inquiry, and yet Popkin’s question 
persists. How can we know that a law judge is judging well; how can we 
judge judging well? 
It should be apparent that this question calls for a judgment, and we can 
expect no more and no less than a judgment. The scholar’s judgment of 
assessment is no different from the judgment of the law judge that is under 
question. It would be foolish to purport to provide a deductive judgment 
that can be assessed according to objective criteria. I can only exercise 
judgment, and my assessment of whether a law judge has judged well is 
subject to the same determination of whether I have judged well. In the 
manner of the law judge, I can establish that I am judging well by 
defending my judgment as a productive hermeneutical reading of the 
tradition and a persuasive rhetorical elaboration of the judgment. And so, 
too, for my critics. In other words, it is only in application that I can 
establish the validity of my scholarly argument. In what follows, I assess a 
recent Court of Appeals case regarding the scope of Title IV protections 
for gays and lesbians to assess if the judges judged well. My goal is to 
redeem the preceding argument in the exercise of judging a court’s 
judgment. 
 
A. Sexual Orientation Discrimination under Title VII: Respecting 
Authority 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 declares it to be unlawful for 
an employer to discriminate “because of” an employee’s “race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin,” and affords a civil remedy to the affected 
employee.67 Since the controversial Act was passed, there has been 
 
 
though not circumscribed by the boundaries posed by tenets and precepts, is complementary 
to rule-making and rule-following. The exercise of judgment relies on rules, principles, and 
laws for support, even as it transcends or transforms them. Hence Aristotle’s man of practical 
wisdom, the phronimos, does not ignore rules and models, or dispense justice without criteria. 
He is observant of principles and, at the same time, open to their modification. He begins with 
nomoi – established law – and employs practical wisdom to determine how it should be 
applied in particular situations and when departures are warranted. Rules provide the 
guideposts for inquiry and critical reflection. 
 When established principle of law comes to serve as a final destination rather than a 
launching pad for inquiry and deliberation, practical judgment is precluded. 
Id. at 5. 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
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extensive litigation over its scope. With regard to race, the Supreme Court 
has recognized “disparate impact” discrimination as a violation,68 
permitted some measure of “affirmative action” to overcome disparities 
rooted in past discrimination,69 and prohibited an employer from 
discarding the results of a promotion test merely because the results had a 
disparate impact.70 Many of the principles articulated in these cases are 
equally applied in cases alleging sex discrimination.71 These cases each 
inspired passionate dissents and engendered ongoing debate about how 
best to interpret the provisions of Title VII. Recently, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that discriminating against gay 
employees is a form of “sex” discrimination under Title VII.72 I use this 
case to assess the activity of judging well. 
I begin with the initial panel opinion.73 The facts before the court were 
simple. An adjunct teacher filed a bare-bones pro se complaint with the 
EEOC alleging that she was passed over for full-time teaching positions 
and other forms of promotion because she is a lesbian. The straightforward 
legal question presented was whether the statutory proscription of 
“discrimination on the basis of . . . sex” forbids discrimination based on an 
employee’s sexual orientation. The panel unanimously determined that 
claims for sexual orientation discrimination are not cognizable under Title 
VII, as had been established under unanimous precedent in the Circuit.74 
And yet, as explained below, the panel signaled its uncertainty about this 
result. 
First, it is interesting to note that Judge Ripple declined to join the bulk 
of the opinion, aligning himself only with the straightforward analysis that 
Circuit precedent had clearly determined that sexual orientation 
discrimination is not a violation of Title VII. Was this judging well? Judge 
Ripple might be characterized as adopting a “rule following” approach in 
this case, which is to say that he regarded the only valid judgment to be 
finding the case at hand within the scope of an established rule. A panel 
cannot overturn settled Circuit precedent, and so there is seemingly 
 
 
       68. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
69.   United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 70. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 71. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (extending the Weber 
analysis of affirmative action based on race to address imbalances due to past discrimination to cases 
involving sex discrimination). 
72.   Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. en banc 2017). 
       73.   Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., South Bend, 830 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (vacated by 
rehearing en banc October 11, 2016). 
 74. Ultimately, the Court sitting en banc overruled four cases that established the clear rule in the 
Circuit. See Doe v. City of Belleville, Il., 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. 
and Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 
(7th Cir. 2000); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., 332 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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nothing left to say once the application of the rule is clear. Unfortunately, 
Judge Ripple chose not to write a concurring opinion to explain why he 
did not join the entire opinion. He might have been registering 
disagreement with the court’s presumptuousness of writing beyond the 
settled rule, or he might have disagreed with the court’s particular analysis 
of the weaknesses in the precedential rule. In one important respect, then, 
Judge Ripple has not judged well because he has not explained the basis of 
his judgment nor sought to persuade the audience that there is good reason 
not to join the full opinion. As Popkin emphasizes, there is a special kind 
of judgment that seeks to command respect by persuasion, rather than 
simple authority (as in the case with sports officiating).75  
Judge Rovner’s opinion for the panel demonstrates several qualities of 
judging well. In the first section of his opinion he states that the 
straightforward legal issue is whether discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is cognizable under Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination. In 
the second part of his opinion he first establishes the baseline doctrinal 
rule that is unequivocal and uniform in the circuit: the claim is not 
cognizable. Moreover, multiple efforts to amend Title VII expressly to 
include sexual orientation discrimination have not resulted in any 
amendments, despite the fact that Congress was well aware of the case law 
and the statement by multiple courts that the situation required a 
legislative intervention.76 The court notes that it “could make short shrift 
of its task” by simply citing precedent and affirming the district court’s 
dismissal of the action.77 However, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) had recently criticized the uniform interpretations by 
Courts of Appeals, and so the panel felt compelled to consider this new 
challenge. The panel acknowledged that the EEOC had criticized “courts–
and pointed particularly to this circuit–that ‘simply cite earlier and dated 
decisions without any additional analysis’ even in light of the relevant 
intervening Supreme Court law.”78 The EEOC concluded that 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was inherently sex 
 
 
 75. One would not expect a detailed explanation in a run of the mill case in which quibbling over 
details of the opinion appears unwarranted. This case does not fit that mold. The panel likely assumed 
that there would be an en banc hearing, and the issue was incredibly important in jurisdictions across 
the country. Interestingly, Judge Ripple joined with Judge Flaum’s concurrence in the en banc decision 
that found in favor of the plaintiff, but on different grounds than the majority. Hively, 853 F.3d at 357 
(Flaum, J., concurring). Perhaps if Judge Ripple had written a concurring opinion in the case before 
the panel it might have aided in the argument and decision of the en banc court.   
 76. Hively, 830 F.3d at 701–02. 
 77. Id. at 699. 
 78. Id. at 703 (quoting Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 
*8, n.11 (July 16, 2015)). 
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discrimination because the categories cannot be completely disentangled, 
the employee is suffering associational discrimination on the basis of sex, 
and the discrimination is rooted in gender stereotypes that constitute sex 
discrimination.79 
The panel opinion discussed each of these grounds in turn. First, the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of gender stereotypes as a form of sex 
discrimination covered by Title VII80 caused lower courts to distinguish 
situations in which the discrimination was premised on sex as opposed to 
sexual orientation. But the case law was inconsistent and unsatisfactory. 
Ultimately, these lines of doctrine became hopelessly confused. 
Lesbian women and gay men upend our gender paradigms by their 
very status–causing us to question and casting into doubt antiquated 
and anachronistic ideas about what roles men and women should 
play in their relationships. Who is dominant and who is submissive? 
Who is charged with earning a living and who makes a home? Who 
is a father and who a mother? In this way the roots of sexual 
orientation discrimination and gender discrimination wrap around 
each other inextricably. In response to the new EEOC decision, one 
court has bluntly declared that the lines are not merely blurry, but 
are, in fact, un-definable. See Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., No. 
CV1500298, 2015 WL 8916764, at *6 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 15, 2015) 
(“Simply put, the line between sex discrimination and sexual 
orientation discrimination is ‘difficult to draw’ because that line 
does not exist, save as a lingering and faulty judicial construct.”) 
Whether the line is nonexistent or merely exceeding difficult to 
find, it is certainly true that the attempt to draw and observe a line 
between the two types of discrimination results in a jumble of 
inconsistent precedents.81 
The opinion recounts in some detail the difficulties courts have 
encountered, making clear that the doctrinal line is not defensible in a 
principled manner. 
The court then reviewed recent Supreme Court decisions articulating 
constitutional rights prohibiting unequal treatment of gay persons as a 
backdrop to a changing legal landscape. On this point the panel was more 
restrained. It rejected the implicit suggestion that the recent gay rights 
jurisprudence should lead the court to protect gays against discrimination, 
and acknowledged that if the Supreme Court wished to extend the scope of 
its gay rights jurisprudence that it was incumbent upon the Court to 
 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 81. Hively, 830 F.3d at 706. 
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express this directly.82 
The final and most persuasive argument discussed by the court is the 
analogy to associational discrimination in race discrimination cases. 
Courts have repeatedly found that discrimination against an employee 
because she is married to, or otherwise associates with, a person of a 
different race is discrimination “because of” race.83 The panel concluded 
that the same reasoning should apply to a case in which an employee is 
discriminated against “because of [her wife’s] sex.” 
Consequently, if Title VII protects from discrimination a white 
woman who is fired for romantically associating with an African-
American man, then logically it should also protect a woman who 
has been discriminated against because she is associating 
romantically with another woman, if the same discrimination would 
not have occurred were she sexually or romantically involved with a 
man.84 
And yet, the panel again acknowledged that the Supreme Court had 
never taken a case to correct the unanimous rulings of the lower courts, 
nor had Congress enacted any of a number of proposed amendments to 
correct the reading of Title VII. Reluctantly, the opinion ends by 
recognizing that the “writing is on the wall” that workplace discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation is socially unacceptable, but until “the 
writing comes in the form of a Supreme Court opinion or new legislation, 
we must adhere to the writing of our prior precedent.”85 
The panel opinion is an example of judging well. The court accepted 
that precedent compelled the answer to the appeal, but recognized the need 
to express how the clear doctrinal rule was highly suspect, both in terms of 
the first precedent that set the course and also in light of developments 
culminating in the EEOC opinion that the courts were misreading Title 
VII. The panel explains that it is bound by a rule of decision, even as it 
acknowledges that the effective history of Title VII can no longer support 
the precedential decisions, if they ever were correct. A bold panel might 
have simply declared the precedent outdated, pushing the case to an en 
banc hearing or to the Supreme Court in a more aggressive manner. But 
this would have risked abrogating the judicial role in this case, which is to 
interpret the law in application to the facts before it from within the 
 
 
 82. Id. at 713–15. 
 83. Id. at 715–17. 
 84. Id. at 717. 
 85. Id. at 718. 
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tradition.86 
The deeper elements of judging well, which I briefly summarize, are 
implicit in this lawyerly approach. Before assessing the opinions, it is 
helpful to review our philosophical reconstruction of judging well. We 
begin with “ordinary judging,” which is a human capacity that is 
ubiquitous, unavoidable and foundational in human life. Judging is much 
more deeply rooted than later cognitive developments that Kant explored 
in their “pure” forms. Judging requires experience in the sense of 
Erfahrung: which becomes part of a dynamic, continuous and cumulative 
process that nourishes the development of our “common sense.” Cognitive 
science reveals the degree to which we adapt through experience to enable 
more productive judging. Judging well is not deductive nor inductive, but 
rather involves a reciprocal fusion of horizons. Interpretation occurs only 
in the application of a text in a concrete setting, under the conditions of 
what Gadamer terms the “logic of the question and answer.” Judging and 
interpretation are deeply connected then, and the vibrancy of interpretive 
practices correlates with the integrity of resulting judgments. This all is 
captured by Popkin’s distinction between declarative judging undertaken 
by a sports official vested with full authority, and rhetorical judging 
undertaken by a critic or law judge that seeks to persuade an audience of 
the validity of the judgment. 
We see evidence of these elements in the majority opinion. The court 
recognizes that the text of Title VII has a history of effects, in that its 
meaning has been shaped over time as courts have sought to apply it to 
different circumstances and contexts. Meaning is not a datum that is 
stagnant and fully knowable for all circumstances and times. Our ability to 
understand and then to judge doesn’t work in that manner. Title VII has a 
complex history embedded in the legal, social and political system that 
continues to unfold. The key is that the court understands that meaning 
unfolds through time. Meaning is not first one discrete experience and 
then another. Under these unavoidable conditions, judging is not simply 
serving as a neutral umpire and calling objective balls and strikes. To 
judge well requires the law judge to exhibit hermeneutical discernment 
 
 
 86. The qualifier “in this case” is intentional. My point is not that judging well always requires 
following a clearly stated rule. In important cases the moral considerations may be so weighty as to 
lead a judge to refuse to enforce a rule. Consider the phenomenon of northern judges enforcing the 
Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 despite their clear moral opposition to slavery. See ROBERT 
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975). There may be times when one must ignore a rule to try to prevent 
grave injustice, or to resign in the face of the conflict. However, in most such cases there is likely to be 
some argument grounded in legal principles if the judge acknowledges the grounds of judging well. 
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, THE LAW OF THE SLAVE-CATCHERS, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT 
1437 (Dec. 5, 1975) (reviewing Cover’s book and concluding that judges could have found the Acts 
unconstitutional). 
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and rhetorical persuasiveness in declaring the meaning of the text for the 
case at hand, without a safety net of certain answers. This capacity is 
foundational; we exercise it constantly in daily life. What makes judging 
well daunting is that the law judge must strive to judge in good faith and 
not permit unacceptable motivations to interfere with her judgment. 
 
B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination under Title VII: Deciding on the 
Merits 
 
We may turn now to the opinions rendered en banc, a setting in which 
the court is able to reconsider and reject its own precedents.87 In this 
important and divisive case there is surprising agreement among the 
judges as to what is at stake. Although free to act in the absence of 
contrary Supreme Court authority, the court proceeds by attempting to 
judge well rather than simply asserting its will. In a sense, it is only in the 
en banc setting that the judges are able to exercise the full scope of 
judgment because they are not bound by the precedent of previous panels 
and there is no direct Supreme Court precedent on the question presented. 
The court begins by noting that the precedential rule was first stated in 
dicta and then followed in subsequent cases without any analysis, that 
other Court of Appeals panels were beginning to question the rule and 
urge reconsideration en banc, and that the broad judicial support for gay 
rights had led to bizarre contradictions in current law, leading the court to 
“conclude today that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a 
form of sex discrimination.”88 The court emphasizes the truism that it 
cannot amend or update the statute, but instead is limited to interpreting 
the legal text.89 As Popkin puts the issue: a law judge seeks to render a 
correct judgment rather than to exercise her will. 
Statutory interpretation does not have a single metric, and the court 
clearly rejects an intent-based inquiry that amounts to asking whether the 
congressional drafters would be surprised by a decision about the statutory 
meaning.90 But the court goes farther by emphasizing that statutory 
meaning is dynamic and historical rather than fixed in time. “The 
goalposts have been moving over the years, as the Supreme Court has shed 
more light on the scope of the language that already is in the statute: no 
 
 
 87. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 88. Id. at 341. 
 89. Id. at 343. 
       90.   Id. at 344–45 (citing Oncal v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) and other 
cases that have developed Title VII doctrine beyond anything arguably foreseen by the drafters). 
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sex discrimination.”91 Essentially, the court acknowledges that its task is to 
define the meaning of the statute in light of the effective history of the text 
and in proper application to the circumstances of the present, which are 
shaped by intervening developments. This is not to say that the court is 
changing the meaning, but only that it is considering that the original 
circuit decision in dicta was incorrect on the basis of what we now 
understand about the meaning of the statute. 
The court offers two arguments. First, it utilizes the “comparative” 
approach of deciding whether “sex discrimination” has occurred by 
changing only the gender of the aggrieved person and determining if the 
employer would have acted similarly.92 This test works well in stock 
cases, such as by asking whether an applicant would have been hired with 
all the same credentials and experience if she were male rather than 
female. When sexual orientation is the basis for decision, however, the 
employer can assert that men and women are treated exactly the same: 
neither is welcomed if they are in a same sex relationship. Indeed, the 
dissent exploits the many weaknesses in the court’s use of the comparative 
approach, which is an evidentiary tool to prove discriminatory intent rather 
than a method of statutory interpretation.93 The court’s lead argument is 
not persuasive precisely because it seems to be using a technical maneuver 
to shield the substantive decision. The dissent applies the comparative 
approach in an overly narrow manner,94 but the result is a battle that 
amounts to quibbling over formal approaches rather than getting to the 
heart of the issue. 
The court then turns to the associational theory of discrimination as its 
second argument in favor of reversing circuit precedent. In the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia,95 courts acknowledged 
that it is discriminatory to treat people on the basis of the race of those 
whom they associate with. Some courts extended this theory to Title VII 
liability for “discrimination because of race.” Because race and sex are not 
treated differently in the statute,96 the court held that an employer cannot 
 
 
91.   Id. at 344. 
 92. Id. at 345–47. 
 93. Id. at 359 (Sykes, J., dissenting). Judge Sykes argues forcefully that “the comparative method 
of proof is an evidentiary test; it is not an interpretive tool. It tells us nothing about the meaning or 
scope of Title VII.” Hively, 853 F.3d at 366. She contends that the court is using this thought 
experiment “as a rhetorical device to conjure an entirely new understanding of the term ‘sex 
discrimination’ for use in the Title VII context . . .” Id. at 367. 
94.   Id. at 366 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“The court’s reasoning essentially distills to this: If we 
compare Hively, a homosexual woman, to hypothetical Professor A, a heterosexual man, we can see 
that Ivy Tech is actually disadvantaging Hively because she is a woman.”). 
95.   Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
96.   The court is certainly correct that “race” and “sex” are treated equally by the statute, but this 
obscures the interesting, if not downright bizarre, politics that led to the inclusion of “sex” in the 
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discriminate because of the sex of an employee’s partner. The court 
carefully unfolds this conclusion as the result of a process of slowly 
learning the scope of racial discrimination and now extending that doctrine 
to discrimination based on the sex of an employee’s partner. This is the 
necessary foundation upon which the court can employ the comparative 
theory to conclude that sexual orientation discrimination is “because of 
sex.” 
The court explains that its “decision must be understood against the 
backdrop of the Supreme Court’s decisions, not only in the field of 
employment discrimination, but also in the area of broader discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.”97 It was against this historical trajectory 
of decisions that the EEOC concluded that it was not legitimate to attempt 
to distinguish discrimination on the basis of sex from discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. The court draws the same conclusion and 
reverses the circuit precedent. 
The logic of the Supreme Court’s decisions as well as the common 
 
 
statute. When Title VII was being debated in the House of Representatives there were numerous 
attempts by conservatives to derail its passage, especially by proposing “poison pill” amendments that 
would make the statute unattractive to some of its supporters. The category of “sex” was added at the 
last minute on the motion of Howard Smith, a conservative Virginia Democrat who was intent on 
derailing the enactment of Title VII. Interestingly, Representative Smith was a strong proponent of 
equal rights for women and the Equal Rights Act even as he fought against civil rights measures that 
included race. Liberal supporters of the bill, led by Representative Manny Celler of Massachusetts, 
immediately spoke against the amendment for fear that including gender discrimination would weaken 
support for the bill among conservative men. However, the women Representatives in the House 
joined with the conservative southern Democrats to adopt the amendment. As Chief Justice Rehnquist 
later noted in the first case to recognize hostile work environment sexual harassment as a violation of 
Title VII: 
The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last minute 
on the floor of the House of Representatives. 110 Cong. Rec. 2577–84 (1964). The principal 
argument in opposition to the amendment was that “sex discrimination” was sufficiently 
different from other types of discrimination that it ought to receive separate legislative 
treatment. See id. at 2577 (statement of Rep. Celler quoting letter from United States 
Department of Labor); id. at 2584 (statement of Rep. Green). This argument was defeated, the 
bill quickly passes as amended, and we are left with little legislative history to guide us in 
interpreting the Act’s prohibition against discrimination based on “sex.” 
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986). This history signals that Title VII is 
far more complex than it appears on its face to modern eyes. How should courts interpret a “poison 
pill” amendment that becomes law? On the other hand, scholars have argued that the enactment of the 
bill with “sex” was the product of opportunistic hard work by progressive women representatives who 
turned a defensive maneuver against the conservatives in a successful effort to provide equal rights to 
women in the workplace. See generally, Clinton Jacob Woods, Strange Bedfellows: Congressman 
Howard W. Smith and the Inclusion of Sex Discrimination in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 16 S. STUDIES 
1 (2009); Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public 
Policy, 9 LAW & INEQUALITY 163 (1990). 
 97. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349. 
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sense reality that it is actually impossible to discriminate on the 
basis of sexual orientation without discrimination on the basis of 
sex, persuade us that the time has come to overrule our previous 
cases that have endeavored to find and observe that line.98 
Having judged the application of Title VII with historical sensitivity, 
the court concludes by noting that it has not resolved all the issues relevant 
to regarding sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination.99 The 
unfolding of legal meaning in changing contexts and in response to new 
situations will continue. 
We can highlight the approach adopted by the majority by considering 
it in light of the concurring and dissenting opinions. Judge Posner’s 
concurring opinion starkly exhibits his “pragmatist” approach to judging. 
Judges generally seek the meaning of a statute by looking for an “original” 
meaning as understood at the time of enactment, or for an unexpressed 
intent or purpose that can guide the application of the statute in situations 
not contemplated by the drafters.100 Posner offers a third alternative: 
“Finally and most controversially, interpretation can mean giving a fresh 
meaning to a [legal text]–a meaning that infuses the [legal text] with 
vitality and significance today.”101 More expressly, he suggests that the 
fifty-year-old Title VII “invites an interpretation that will update it to the 
present” because “it takes years, often many years, for a shift in the 
political and cultural environment to change the understanding of the 
statute.”102 On this basis, one might conclude that Judge Posner is 
rectifying a social problem that has emerged by updating an anti-
discrimination statute to address biases that were not addressed by the 
original enactment, perhaps because the biases did not fully exist at that 
time. 
I would prefer to see us acknowledge openly that today we, who are 
judges rather than members of Congress, are imposing on a half-
century-old statute a meaning of “sex discrimination” that the 
Congress that enacted it would not have accepted. This is something 
courts do fairly frequently to avoid statutory obsolescence and 
concomitantly to avoid placing the entire burden of updating old 
statutes on the legislative branch. We should not leave the 
impression that we are merely the obedient servants of the 88th 
 
 
 98. Id. at 350–51. 
 99. Id. at 351. 
 100. Id. at 352 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 101. Id. Judge Posner cites the Sherman Antitrust Act and the willingness of courts to update the 
statute by analyzing monopoly power in terms of modern economic understanding. 
 102. Id.  
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Congress (1963-1965), carrying out their wishes. We are not. We 
are taking advantage of what the last half century has taught.103 
Judge Posner rebukes the majority for pretending to “interpret,” when 
in fact they are “updating” Title VII to correct what we have come to see 
as an omission in the list of persons protected. 
Judge Posner explains that an ordinary understanding of the meaning of 
“sex discrimination” would likely not include discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, thereby rendering the statute anachronistic in light of 
our contemporary understanding that gays and lesbians are not making a 
“choice” about their sexuality, are “normal in the ways that count,” and 
“play an essential role” in our country.104 
The compelling social interest in protecting homosexuals (male and 
female) from discrimination justifies an admittedly loose 
“interpretation” of the word “sex” in Title VII to embrace 
homosexuality: an interpretation that cannot be imputed to the 
framers of the statute but that we are entitled to adopt in light of (to 
quote Holmes) “what this country has become,” or, in Blackstonian 
terminology, to embrace as a sensible deviation from the literal or 
original meaning of the statutory language.105 
It is difficult to see this as anything other than the exercise of will by a 
judge acting as lawmaker. Judge Posner reveals clearly that he is making a 
policy choice: “I don’t see why firing a lesbian because she is in the subset 
of women who are lesbians should be thought any less a form of sex 
discrimination than firing a woman because she is a woman.”106 
Judge Posner does not embrace the philosophical underpinnings of 
judging well. He starts by recognizing that the statute doesn’t mention 
“sexual orientation” and that the framers did not have this category in 
mind when Title VII was enacted, and then acknowledges that this 
requires the court to explain how the statutory meaning is now changing 
 
 
 103. Id. at 357. Judge Posner notes that homosexuality “was almost invisible in the 1960’s” and 
thus, the drafters of Title VII did not consciously target a bias. Hively, 853 F.3d at 353.  Judge Posner 
chides the majority for attempting to smuggle changing social attitudes into their analysis by loosely 
referring to Supreme Court cases that expanded anti-discrimination principles. Id. at 355–56. 
 104. Id. at 354–55. 
 105. Id. at 355. 
 106. Id. at 355. Since Posner expressly avoided Loving’s association theory in his opinion, Hively, 
853 F.3d at 356, this same argument could be used to establish discrimination on the basis of weight as 
a form of discrimination because of sex. While it might be eminently sensible and just to conclude that 
discrimination against someone in the “subset of women who are obese” deserves protection no less 
than someone who is fired for being a woman, this would certainly would be viewed as judicial 
willfulness, extending civil rights protections to entirely new classes of plaintiffs. 
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after fifty-three years.107 This opposition of the time of the drafting and the 
present is artificial. The statute doesn’t mention “sexual harassment,” 
“disparate impact,” or “voluntary affirmative action,” either, but the courts 
have continually elaborated these meanings of the statute since it was 
enacted. Against Judge Posner’s assumption that we reach a point in social 
development that requires the courts to suddenly “update” the statute years 
later, the meaning of a statute is the product of the history of its effects as 
it is applied in specific cases. It is not the case that statutes “frequently [in 
the sense of not rarely] are interpreted on the basis of present need and 
understanding rather than original meaning,”108 but rather that every 
interpretation of a statute occurs only in application to the case at hand. 
There is irony in concluding that Judge Posner’s thoroughgoing pragmatist 
perspective is too beholden to the mirage of “original meaning” that can 
later be cast aside at the appropriate moment for updating the law.109 
In contrast, Judge Flaum concurred in the judgment but adopted a less 
wide-ranging justification for his conclusion.110 He did not join Part III of 
the majority opinion, which uses the Supreme Court’s gay rights cases as 
contextual support for the holding. Judge Flaum strives to make the case 
simple, straightforward and noncontroversial. In essence, he concludes 
that an employer cannot discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation 
without knowing the sex of the employee and her partner. Consequently, 
the employment action is “necessarily, in part, discrimination” because of 
sex.111 This effort to simplify the case as a matter of syntax comes off as 
an effort to ignore the context of the decision and to avoid the judicial role. 
Judge Flaum would surely criticize the conclusion that “because of sex” 
can be read as “because of coital activity,” under simple interpretive 
principles, even though this legitimate reading would easily incorporate 
sexual orientation discrimination into the statute. There is no linguistic 
fault with this analysis, but it obviously misses the contextual meaning and 
historical development of the meaning of the statutory text under review. 
From the opposite side, in her dissenting opinion Judge Sykes accuses 
the majority of usurping legislative power precisely in the manner 
celebrated by Judge Posner. Judge Sykes regards the interpretive question 
as relatively easy and straightforward. “An employer who refuses to hire 
homosexuals is not drawing a line based on the job applicant’s sex. . . . To 
 
 
 107. Id. at 353. 
  108. Id. 
     109.   For my critique of the presuppositions of new textualism, see Francis J. Mootz III, Getting 
Over the Originalist Fixation, in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN 
LEARN ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY, 156–90 (Brian G. 
Slocum, ed., 2017). 
     110.   Hively, 853 F.3d at 357 (Flaum, J., concurring). 
     111.   Id. at 358. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018]                                               JUDGING WELL                                                    33 
 
 
 
 
put the matter plainly, heterosexuality is not a female stereotype; it is not a 
male stereotype; it is not a sex-specific stereotype at all.”112 The majority’s 
use of the comparative method is merely a “rhetorical device”;113 the 
invocation of Loving, Obergefell and other constitutional decisions to 
suggest a zeitgeist favoring gay rights is doctrinally irrelevant;114 and the 
majority ignores the special significance of stare decisis in the statutory 
realm.115 The dissent makes a straightforward point: Judge Posner 
accurately describes the basis of the majority opinion, but it is an extra-
judicial assertion of will rather than a pragmatic act that should be 
celebrated. 
The court’s new liability rule is entirely judge-made; it does not 
derive from the text of Title VII in any meaningful sense. 
. . . . 
It’s understandable that the court is impatient to protect lesbians and 
gay men from workplace discrimination without waiting for 
Congress to act. Legislative change is arduous and can be slow to 
come. But we’re not authorized to amend Title VII by 
interpretation. The ordinary, reasonable, and fair meaning of sex 
discrimination as that term is used in Title VII does not include 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, a wholly different kind 
of discrimination. Because Title VII does not by its terms prohibit 
sexual-orientation discrimination, Hively’s case was properly 
dismissed.116 
Judge Posner encourages honesty about the willful nature of the majority’s 
opinion, whereas Judge Sykes indicts the majority’s covert strategies for 
imposing its will. 
Judge Sykes places no stock in the original intentions of the drafters, 
and she argues that the text of the statute is the anchor of interpretations.117 
 
 
 112. Id. at 357, 365, 370 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. at 367. 
 114. Id. at 367–69, 372. Judge Sykes argues that the curiosity of federal constitutional law 
protecting the right of gays and lesbians to marry, even though Title VII does not prevent 
discrimination against them in the workplace, is simply a matter of noting the difference between a 
constitutional restraint on governmental behavior and a statutory restraint on private behavior. Id. at 
372. Moreover, she argues that the fact that the Supreme Court did not apply the intermediate scrutiny 
constitutional standard to gay rights indicates that the Court did not regard sex discrimination as one 
and the same with sexual-orientation discrimination. Id. 
 115. Hively, 853 F.3d at at 372–73. 
 116. Id. at 372–74. 
 117. Id. at 359, 361–62. 
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From this perspective, the case is “momentous”118 because “[j]udicial 
statutory updating, whether overt or covert, cannot be reconciled with the 
constitutional design.”119 Judge Sykes finds that the court has exercised its 
will to augment the statutory law, rather than remaining restrained, but her 
critique is rooted in a misunderstanding of the nature of interpretation and 
the qualities of judging well in situations that lack objective, logical, and 
precise answers. Judge Sykes describes her new textualist theory of 
judging as obedience to fixed meanings. 
Respect for the constraints imposed on the judiciary by a system of 
written law must begin with fidelity to the traditional first principle 
of statutory interpretation: When a statute supplies the rule of 
decision, our role is to give effect to the enacted text, interpreting 
the statutory language as a reasonable person would have 
understood it at the time of enactment. We are not authorized to 
infuse the text with a new or unconventional meaning or to update it 
to respond to changed social, economic, or political conditions. 
. . . . 
. . . That is why a textualist decision method matters: When we 
assume the power to alter the original public meaning of a statute 
through the process of interpretation, we assume a power that is not 
ours. The Constitution assigns the power to make and amend 
statutory law to the elected representative for the people. However, 
welcome today’s decision might be as a policy matter, it comes at a 
great cost to representative self-government.120 
Judge Sykes indicts the majority for brazenly ignoring the original (and 
fixed) meaning of the statute in order to revise the rule so as to take 
account of social changes.121 
It is clear that this approach to statutory interpretation is ill-founded, 
and therefore will interfere with judging well. First, positing meaning as 
being “fixed” at a given historical point in time ignores how all historical 
knowledge is hermeneutically recovered no less than other forms of 
interpretation.122 Judge Sykes’s arguments proceed from faulty 
metaphysics, and therefore are not persuasive as cast. Even accepting her 
presupposition that how a reasonable person would have understood the 
 
 
 118. Id. at 359. 
 119. Id. at 360. 
     120.   Id. 
 121. Id. at 373 (“The court’s new liability rule is entirely judge-made; it does not derive from the 
text of Title VII in any meaningful sense.”). 
 122. I make this argument in detail in Mootz, supra note 109. 
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statutory text at the time of enactment is unchanging and can be discerned 
objectively, Judge Sykes would have difficulty explaining why “sex” 
could not be interpreted as referring to activity engaged in by two persons. 
Dictionary definitions confirm this alternative ordinary meaning of 
“sex.”123 It would appear that discrimination on the basis of a person’s 
sexual orientation is “discrimination based on . . . sex” in the sense that the 
discrimination is based on the sexual activities of the employee. Such an 
argument would not be judging well, which is why Judge Flaum would not 
pursue it. It would not be judging well because it would ignore the context, 
purpose, and development of Title VII. And so, Judge Sykes cannot 
pretend to find certainty in the ordinary meaning of the statutory words 
alone.124 
This is not to say that the majority’s opinion is “correct” or that Judge 
Sykes is wholly unpersuasive in her dissent. For example, she ends her 
opinion by referring to the principle that stare decisis has special force 
with regard to statutory interpretation. This principle is grounded in the 
desire for stability in statutory law, and the recognition that Congress may 
amend the statute if the authoritative judicial interpretation is unwelcome. 
This principle has no necessary relation to the notion of fixed textual 
meaning, but it can serve as a good institutional argument against frequent 
changes in authoritative interpretations of statutory language that would 
lead to uncertainty. One must draw a line between reversing a previous 
interpretation and understanding the statute in light of its history of effects. 
 
 
123.   See, e.g., THE OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sex (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (listing the first definition 
as “sexual activity, including specifically sexual intercourse,” and the second definition as “Either of 
the two main categories (male and female) into which humans and most other living things are divided 
on the basis of their reproductive functions.”); MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, 
https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/sex_1 (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) 
(listing the first definition as “the activity in which people kiss and touch each other’s sexual organs, 
which may also include sexual intercourse, and the second definition as “males or females considered 
as separate groups.”); CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/sex (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (listing the first 
definition as “the state of being either male or female,” and the second definition as “physical activity 
between people involving the sexual organs.”).   
       124.   This point is obvious and unavoidable because meaning is always contextual, but there are 
degrees of context that judges deem acceptable. No judge would conclude that firing someone for 
participating in the Boston Marathon would be actionable as an employment decision “because of [a] 
race.” It is always possible to think of absurd meanings that ignore the context of a polysemous word 
such as race. My point is that the word “sex” has two meanings closely related to the context of sexual 
harassment law. The fact that “sex” refers both to gender and coitus is not a frivolous coincidence 
given the focus of Title VII to address harassing behavior premised on gender bias and also 
harassment that is sexual in nature. I offer this argument as an example of how one might use “plain 
meaning” strategically to support the result, although this would not be judging well. 
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And, of course, this line drawing calls upon nothing less than the capacity 
to judge well. 
I have assessed the degree to which competing opinions in the Hively 
case exemplify judging well. One does not judge well by following a 
methodology, no matter how capacious that methodology might be 
defined. Judging well acknowledges the ontology of understanding as an 
“application” in a practical context, a fusion of horizons within a tradition 
that propels the tradition forward. This does not empower the judge to 
exercise her unrestrained will, as there is no subject-object opposition in a 
fusion of horizons. Judging well requires the interpreter to be open to the 
effective-history of the text. By embracing this way of knowing, a judge 
can achieve rhetorical knowledge about the meaning of a text, which is to 
say that the judge may articulate a reasonable meaning in application to 
the case at hand, even if she cannot declare meaning as a function of 
deductive reason. 
It bears emphasis that judging well does not call on a judge to choose 
to adopt a strategy, as this would be an exercise of will. As Gadamer 
insists, philosophical hermeneutics provides a phenomenology of 
understanding, an ontological description of “what happens to us over and 
above or wanting and doing.”125 To judge well, the judge must comport 
herself in accordance with the nature of rhetorical knowledge. This means 
to hold herself open to the text as it has been received in the tradition and 
to relinquish subjective goals that would be achieved by imposing 
meaning on the text. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this article, I have provided the philosophical backdrop for an 
account of “judging well” that productively reframes the debate about the 
integrity of judicial practice in the modern administrative state. My 
account expressly accepts more leeway for judges than traditional 
jurisprudential accounts that assume that every case has one correct 
answer, but this article has argued that this leeway exists whether it is 
expressly acknowledged or not. By working from an accurate ontology of 
understanding, we can provide plausible accounts of how law judges may 
refrain from imposing their will, and instead judge well. 
Judging well is not a deductive exercise that can be assessed in terms 
of logic, nor is it an empirical inquiry that can be assessed in terms of 
method. Popkin’s account of “ordinary judging,” when placed on a 
stronger philosophical basis, takes account of a real capacity that may be 
 
 
 125. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 24, at xxviii. 
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deployed with more or less integrity. In other words, we can judge well or 
poorly, and can be judged to have judged well or poorly. Judging well 
draws on hermeneutical and rhetorical capacities that have evolved and 
developed over millennia. These capacities reflect the way our minds 
work. Consequently, judging well creates (rhetorical) knowledge and 
rejects a subjective imposition of meaning. Longstanding traditions have 
studied these capacities, which were essential to humanity’s social and 
political development. An account of judging well that is grounded in an 
account of interpretation, persuasion, and judgment is sufficient to sustain 
the rule of law. 
The Enlightenment, for all of its salutary effects, led us to neglect the 
vital foundation of reasonableness and prudence that subtends all 
knowledge, including knowledge generated through the exercise of reason 
in a logically rigorous, but abstract manner. Our contemporary definition 
of “genuine” knowledge as the knowledge of certainties has caused 
defenders of the legal system to make implausible claims that judges can 
simply “follow the law” in a manner that can be assessed objectively. 
While this might be construed as a harmless and “noble lie” that supports 
the legitimacy of judging, bad metaphysics is corrosive of legitimacy and 
the rule of law.126 Only by directly addressing what it means to judge, and 
what it means to judge well, can we best facilitate the rhetorical 
knowledge upon which our democracy depends.
 
 
 126. At least since the time of the legal realists there has been a vigorous debate as to whether 
legal officials are best served by being honest about the nature of their practice, or whether it is best to 
engage in Plato’s “noble lie” so as to secure the consent of the governed. However, many defenders of 
honesty only address the necessity of stopping the noble lie, and fail to offer an account of 
interpretation and judgment that is not simply a matter of the judge’s predilections. See Jason Iuliano, 
The Supreme Courts Noble Lie, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 911 (2018). This article begins the process of 
articulating a competing ontology of understanding that does not simply disabuse us of our 
wrongheaded assumptions. In the absence of an account of rhetorical knowledge there can only be 
despair when the noble lie is revealed. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
